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VEPCO. Moreover, Sims was not barred from recovery because an insur-
ance company reimbursed him for a loss. Denial of recovery was based on
the conclusion that Sims suffered no loss whatsoever. 8 This conclusion is
consistent with the general purpose of damage awards to provide compen-
sation for losses incurred. 39 Compensation should return the injured person
to his pre-injury position or make him as nearly whole as is possible by a
money award. 0 Actual damage is a prerequisite to recovery,4' and as the
Sims court noted, there was no damage because Sims' position did not
change as a result of his daughter's injury.
2
Where the family is separated and the rights and responsibilities of the
respective parents are determined by court order and state statute rather
than familial affection, Sims has provided an equitable means of determin-
ing which parent is entitled to settle the parents' cause of action. If one
parent chooses not to join in a settlement, the court decision allows the
wrongdoer to settle with the parent who has custody of the child and is
responsible for the costs of the child's cure." Where the parent who chooses
not to join in the settlement can not demonstrate actual damage, recovery
will be denied. 4
ScoT A. STOREY
XII. TRADE REGULATION
Congress has determined that concentration of business into the hands
of a few large corporations is generally repugnant to the ideals of a free
competition.' In response, the judiciary enforces the substantive provisions
of the Sherman Act2 to dismantle anticompetitive combinations and mo-
' See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
"' Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 667 (9th Cir. 1976); Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d
344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954); MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at § 137.
, MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at § 137; James, supra note 35, at 583.
" James, supra note 35, at 582.
4 550 F.2d at 934.
' See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
See generally, U.S. v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 534 (1948) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); A. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN ACr 13 (1910); Symposium, Antitrust
Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political, and Social Goals of Anti-trust
Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1977).
2 Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) makes
"every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations illegal . . . ." Section 2
states in pertinent part that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopo-
lize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor ... ." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
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nopolies, and where the concentration of power' is incipient, uses section
7 of the Clayton Act 4 to extinguish even the possibility of anticompetitive
effect.5 Both Congress and the courts grant exemptions from antitrust
laws, however, when a policy or program that requires economic coordina-
tion has an importance that overrides antitrust policies., Recently, the
Fourth Circuit interpreted the substantive provisions of section 7 of the
Clayton Act, and considered two of the immunities provided by law. The
court also examined and passed on several procedures used to protect the
public from the effects of antitrust violations.
A. Section 7 and Potential Competition
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any merger or acquisition that
would substantially lessen competition within a particular market.7 One
The ill-effects of concentration are most pronounced in an oligopolistic industry or
market, i.e., the more tightly oligopolistic the industry, the greater the anticompetitive effects
of a combination of actual competitors or potential competitors. See Theatre Entrprises, Inc.
v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust
Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. Rsv., 1562-76, 1591-92 (1969); Turner, The Defini-
tion Of Agreement Under The Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism And Refusals To Deal,
75 HARv. L. Rsv. 655 (1962).
Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended by the Act of Dec. 29, 1950, c. 1184,
64 Stat. 731 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), provides in pertinent part that "[n]o corporation
engaged in commerce shall acquire... the stock or... the assets of another corporation also
engaged in commerce where in any line of commerce, in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition, or to tend to create a monop-
oly." (Emphasis supplied).
3In Clayton Act § 7 cases, courts require that the anticompetitive effect of the merger
or acquisition be proved with "reasonable probability." See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 325 (1961). See also 86 HARv. L. Rav. 772, 777 n.26 (1973). The requirement
that the anticompetitive effect be proven with reasonable certainty is derived from the word-
ing of § 7 which prohibits those activities that "may... substantially ... lessen competition,
or tend to create monopoly." The first Senate report on the 1950 Amendment to the Clayton
Act, Act of Dec. 29, 1950, c. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125, stated:
The use of the words ['may be'] means that the bill ... would not apply to the
mere possibility but only to the reasonable probability of the prescribed [sic] effect
.... A requirement of certainty and actuality of injury to competition is incompati-
ble with any effort to supplement the Sherman Act by reaching incipient restraints.
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4293, 4298. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 to remedy a failure of the Sherman Act to
prevent incipient concentration. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.32
(1961). Even where combinations can result in increased efficiency, they are illegal if the
efficiency only exists because of economies of scale. Id. at 294. The purpose of § 7 is to stop
concentration, wherever possible, before it engenders anticompetitive effects. See generally
Turner, Conglomerate Mergers And Section 7 Of The Clayton.Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1313
(1965)[hereinafter cited as Turner].
I See Trade Regulation, Section B, note 1 infra.
I Section 7 prohibits any anticompetitive acquisition, whether characterized as horizon-
tal, vertical, conglomerate, or market extension. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 317 (1961). A horizontal merger or acquisition is an attempt to gain a greater market
share in a relevant market. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966);
United States V. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
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of the problems in the enforcement of section 7 has been potential entrants
that choose to enter markets through acquisition of existing substantial
competitors in those markets rather than enter markets on their own.
Courts have sought to force these potential entrants to take a competitive
stance in the relevant market or keep out. Thus, companies that have the
capability and financial incentives to enter a market usually are not al-
lowed to enter in a way that would have a negative impact on competition.8
A potential entrant is prohibited from entering the market through
substantial acquisition, that is, through acquisition or merger with an
established market force. Instead, a potential entrant must enter de novo
or by "toehold" acquisition.' Entering the market as an entirely new com-
petitor is de novo entry. Acquisition of a relatively small company that is
already established in the market constitutes "toehold" acquisition." Un-
like entry by substantial acquisition, neither de novo entry nor entry by
toehold acquisition deprives the market of a major procompetitive force.
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1961). Vertical integration is an attempt by a company to control every
aspect of the production and distribution of a single product, from the sources of raw materi-
als, through the manufacture, to marketing of the product. See United States v. E. I. DuPont
De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (defendant, supplier of automotive paint to General
Motors, owned 23% stock interest in General Motors); Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293 (1949)(defendant owned oil producing, refining, distributing, and retailing facili-
ties). Conglomerate mergers or acquisitions involve diversification of a company into areas
in which it has no experience. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965);
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); United States v. IT&T Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
A market expansion merger occurs when a company begins to sell a familiar product in a new
geographic market. See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964), or
begins to sell a new product that is similar to products the expanding company already sells.
See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S 568 (1967).
1 See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); R. POSNER, ANTITRusT LAW, 113-25 (1976)[hereinafter cited
as POSNER].
I If a company which has the capability and incentives to enter a market de novo or by
toehold acquisition begins to enter instead by substantial acquisition, one of the agencies
charged with enforcing the Act under 15 U.S.C. § 21(a)(1970) serves a complaint against such
company, and fixes a time and place for a hearing, 15 U.S.C. § 21(b)(1970). The company
charged has an opportunity to show cause why a cease and desist order should not be issued.
Id. The board or commission, upon a finding that one of the provisions of the Act was or is
being violated, may order the charged company to cease and desist violations, and may order
the company to divest itself of stock or assets where the possession of such stock or asset is a
violation. Id. Also, the Federal Trade Commission may obtain a temporary injunction with-
out bond upon a showing before a district court that a corporation is violating or is about to
violate any law enforced by the FTC, and that it is in the public interest to enjoin such
actions. 15 U.S.C. § 53(a)(1970). Review of any of these actions may be obtained in any
United States Circuit Court. 15 U.S.C. § 21(c)(1970).
11 The doctrine of toehold acquisition was introduced in Bendix Corp., 77 FTC 731,
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971). Bendix Corp., a major
producer of automotive parts, was prevented from acquiring Fram, a major producer of
automotive filters. The FTC ruled that any entry into the filter market would have to be by




The anticompetitive effects of a potential competitor's entry by sub-
stantial acquisition have been defined by courts in terms of the "actual
potential entrant" theory and the "perceived potential entrant" theory. An
actual potential entrant is a company that definitely will enter a market
de novo or by toehold acquisition." If the actual potential entrant enters
by substantial acquisition, the market is deprived of one competitor. A
perceived potential entrant, on the other hand, is a company not presently
engaged in the market, but recognized by those in the market as a probable
new entrant. 2 Because a perceived potential entrant has the capability
and financial incentives to enter, it has a procompetitive effect upon the
market as long as it threatens to enter. If it enters by substantial acquisi-
tion, the procompetitive effect is lost. The relation that these theories 3
bear to proof of anticompetitive effect under section 7 is unsettled. The
Supreme Court has not made clear whether it will allow a case to proceed
on the actual potential entrant theory alone, or whether the actual poten-
tial entrant theory always must be presented in conjunction with the per-
ceived potential entrant theory. Furthermore, the Court has not made
clear whether an entry by substantial acquisition on the part of an actual
potential entrant that is not perceived as a potential entrant by existing
competitors in the relevant market can have sufficient anticompetitve
effect to constitute a section 7 violation. The Fourth Circuit faced both
issues in FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co." (Arco), where the Government
based its section 7 charge solely on the actual potential entrant theory.
In Arco the Fourth Circuit considered the proposed acquisition of Ana-
conda, a copper company, by Arco, a potential competitor in the copper
market. Arco and Anaconda were both large, publicly held corporations,
and both were engaged in the mining, refining, and sale of mineral re-
sources. Arco was a leader in the petroleum industry, however, while Ana-
conda was primarily a miner and refiner of cooper. 5 In March of 1976, Arco
" See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 623-24 (1974).
,2 See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 172-74 (1964). See also note
37 infra.
13 Another anticompetitive effect of substantial acquisition is described by the
"entrenchment" theory. A company that already enjoys a substantial market share will be
in an even stronger position if it is acquired by or merges with another large company. Such
a combination, because of its financial strength, can cut prices to drive out competition.
Furthermore, the existence of such a company might discourage new potential competitors
from entering the market. See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578-79
(1967); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729,
773-76 (D. Md. 1976). The entrenchment theory may be applied to prevent a conglomerate
merger or acquisition even where the challenged company is'not a potential competitor.
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249, 1286-87 (N.D. Ohio
1977); see note 43 infra.
" 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977).
IS Arco was the fifteenth largest publicly held corporation in the nation in terms of sales
and revenues, and thirteenth largest in terms of assets. Anaconda was 188th in sales and
revenues, 71st in sales, third in the copper ore and concentrates markets, and fourth in the
refined copper markets. Id. at 291.
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acquired 27% of the common stock of the Anaconda Company through a
tender offer. This transaction between Arco and Anaconda caused the FTC
to commence administrative proceedings'" to determine whether the ac-
quisition might substantially lessen competition in the copper markets in
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
17
The FTC then sued to enjoin the consummation of the merger, charging
that Arco was a potential entrant into the copper market because the
company had the capability and incentivies to enter the copper market de
novo or by toehold acquisition.'8 If Arco were allowed to enter by acquiring
a market leader like Anaconda, the FTC asserted, the copper market
would be deprived of a potential competitor. To counter this assertion,
Arco presented facts dealing with Arco's preparedness to enter the copper
market, including the expenditures of time and effort required by such an
entry, the expense of equipment, and the difficulty of acquiring ore depos-
its."
The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief on the grounds
that the FTC had failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits. 0 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the preliminary injunc-
tion was properly denied.2' The court noted that the case had been pre-
sented by the FTC on the theory that Arco was an actual potential entrant
to the copper market." The government claimed that in all probability
Arco would have entered the copper market de novo or by toehold acquisi-
tion," and that de novo entry or toehold acquisition would have the pro-
competitive effect of adding Arco as a healthy competitor or strengthening
the competitive impact of one of the small companies already in the mar-
ket. The FTC contended that entry by substantial acquisition, on the other
hand, would add nothing to the competitive structure, and would deprive
the market of this procompetitive effect in violation of section 7.24
Anaconda also was involved in the uranium market. Earlier in the proceedings Arco held
some uranium interests, and the charges of anticompetitive acquisition included the anticom-
petitive effect of the acquisition upon the uranium market. Before the Fourth Circuit heard
the case, however, Arco had divested itself of its uranium interests, and the issue was there-
fore moot. Id. at 291.
, Id. at 291; see note 9 supra.
,7 The acquisition in Arco took place before the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, became effective. See Trade Regulation, Section C,
note 27 infra. Title II of that act amends § 7 of the Clayton Act by adding § 7A (to be codified
in 15 U.S.C. § 18a), requiring that both parties to an acquisition file notice with the FTC so
that the FTC can evaluate the anticompetitive effect of the proposed action.
* 549 F.2d at 292-93.
,* Id. at 295.
Id. at 291.
21 Id. at 300.
22Id. at 293.
Id. at 292-93.
24 Id. at 294; see Turner, supra note 5, at 1362-96. Comment, United States v. Falstaff




The court held that to establish an actual potential entrant charge, the
FTC would have to offer "unequivocal proof that the acquiring firm ac-
tually would have entered de novo." The Fourth Circuit found that in
view of the extremely high barriers to entry, and the denial by Arco offi-
cials that the company would enter the copper market de novo, there was
not "unequivocal proof' that a de novo entry would take place. Thus, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court had correctly denied the
FTC's motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground that the FTC had
failed to prove a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits."
The Fourth Circuit noted in Arco that other courts have avoided the
actual potential entrant theory because of the difficulty of proof.2 Because
the court decided that Arco was not an actual potential entrant, however,
it was not forced to answer the question of whether a violation of section 7
occurs when an actual potential entrant that is not also a perceived poten-
tial entrant enters the market by substantial acquisition. The weakness of
the Arco decision is that it focused on the difficulty of proving whether
Arco was or was not an actual potential entrant and failed to follow the
Supreme Court in thoroughly analyzing all possible anticompetitive ef-
fects.3 A court should not terminate its analysis simply because a company
cannot be characterized as an actual potential entrant. The Supreme
Court has indicated that a court's analysis of a potential competition case
may be incomplete if the court does not consider the perceived potential
entrant theory in conjunction with the actual potential entrant theory.
9
Most potential competition cases derive their reasoning from United
States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Company.2 These cases set forth the four
essential elements that must be considered before a section 7 violation can
be found to have occurred. First, the relevant market must be identified.2'
Second, the plaintiffs must prove that the relevant market is so concen-
trated that a new entry could affect the competitive structure benefi-
cially. 12 Third, the plaintiffs must prove that the company charged has the
21 549 F.2d at 294, quoting United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 604
(1974).
21 549 F.2d at 300.
2 Id. at 293; see note 40 infra.
21 See United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975); United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), discussed in Shenefield, Annual
Survey of Antitrust Developments, 1974-1975, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 259, 316-24
(1976)[hereinafter cited as Shenefield].
2 See text accompanying notes 35-46 infra.
3 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). Two large chemical firms,
Pennsalt and Olin, formed a joint venture, Penn-Olin, for the purpose of entering the tightly
oligopolistic southeastern sodium chlorate market. Id. at 162-65. The district court found that
both companies were potential entrants because both had the ability and incentives prior to
forming the joint venture to enter de novo. Id. at 172.
., Id. at 161; accord, United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 618-23
(1974); Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303, 306, 307-10 (7th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 736-41 (D. Md. 1976).
22 378 U.S. at 177; accord, United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 630-
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capability and financial incentives to enter the market de novo or through
toehold acquisition. 3 Finally, the plaintiffs must define the anti-
competitive effects of the challenged entry by substantial acquisition. 4 In
Penn-Olin, for example, the district court performed the first three steps
of the analysis but, upon reaching the final step, decided that the defen-
dants had not been proved actual potential entrants and dismissed the
case. 5 The Supreme Court,3" however, remanded the case, instructing the
district court to consider, in light of the perceived potential entrant theory,
what might be the procompetitive effects of the companies' standing at the
edge of a market continually threatening to enter. 7 More recently, in
32 (1974); Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1976); Missouri Portland
Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1974); Ekco Prod. Co. v. FTC, 347
F.2d 745, 748-50 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp.
729, 748-55 (D. Md. 1976).
The question of probable effect on competition, which involves consideration of market
concentration and market shares, is treated by the courts in quantitative terms. An insight
into the figures involved may be gained by reference to the Department of Justice Guidelines
(1968). 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510. These guidelines are not binding on courts, United
States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), but are useful as persu-
asive summary statements of the law. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc.,
414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970). See generally L. SULLIVAN,
ANTrrRUST 600-69 (1976)[hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN]; 161 VON KALINOWSKi Business Or-
ganizations Series, ANTrTRusT LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, § 74.01-04 (1974)[hereinafter
cited as VON KALINOWSKI]. While some authorities believe that courts should take a thor-
oughly mathematical approach to antitrust enforcement, see Blake, Conglomerate Mergers
and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 555 (1973), there is an indication in recent
Supreme Court cases that the Court will refuse to apply mathematical tests alone, and
instead will demand proof of the likelihood of anticompetitive effect. See Robinson, Recent
Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 243, 243-60(1975); Shenefield, supra note
28, at 326.
1 378 U.S. at 172-75; accord, United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 632-
39 (1974); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 856-58 (2d Cir. 1974);
Ekco Prod. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 748-55 (D. Md 1976).
3 See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra, and notes 35-39 infra.
11 378 U.S. at 173. The district court concluded that if the companies were not allowed
to enter the market in a joint venture, neither company would enter the market alone. United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 130 (D. Del. 1963). The actual potential
entrant theory requires proof that the challenged company would enter de novo or by toehold
acquisition. See note 40 infra.
m 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970) provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a district
court of any civil action raised under the antitrust laws wherein the United States is com-
plainant.
11 378 U.S. at 173. The standard of proof necessary to prove the anticompetitive effect
of a substantial acquisition under the perceived potential entrant theory enunciated in Penn-
Olin requires some demonstration that the potential entrant is having a "wings" effect, see
United States v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F. Supp. 407, 436 (E.D. Mich. 1968), or a "fringe" effect
on the competitive structure of the market. The effect is described by the Court in Penn-Olin
as follows: "The existence of an aggressive, well equipped and well financed corporation
engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic
market would be a substantial incentive to competition which cannot be underestimated."
378 U.S. at 174; see, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 639-64
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United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co.35 the Supreme Court upheld the
lower court's analysis applying the first three steps, but remanded, requir-
ing the district court to apply the perceived potential entrant theory, even
though the government had not developed that theory below. 9
When the Fourth Circuit came to the fourth step of the potential com-
petition analysis in Arco, however, it focused not upon the Supreme
Court's evident desire to do a thorough analysis of the anticompetitive
effect, but upon the Court's treatment of the actual potential entrant
theory." There are two possible explanations for the Fourth Circuit's fail-
(1974); Ekco Prod. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 752-53 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Black
& Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 755-73 (D. Md. 1976).
410 U.S. 526 (1973).
Falstaff, the nation's fifth largest brewer, sought to acquire Narrangansett, the largest
brewer in New England. The government suggested that Falstaff had been interested for some
time in the New England beer market, and had the capability, expertise, and resources to
enter de novo or by toehold acquisition. 410 U.S. at 527-29. The government contended that
for Falstaff to acquire the largest brewer in the New England market rather than enter that
market de novo or by toehold acquisition would deprive the New England beer market of a
competitor. Id. at 530.
The district court accepted the testimony of Falstaff's officers that they had no intention
of entering the New England market de novo or by toehold. Since Falstaff lacked the initia-
tive to enter in one of these two ways, the lower court reasoned the company could not have
been a potential entrant. Therefore, Clayton Act § 7 would not be violated. United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Co., 332 F. Supp. 970, 972 (D.R.I. 1971).
The Supreme Court held that the district court's reasoning was erroneous as a matter of
law. 410 U.S. at 532. Proof that a company could not or would not enter a market was not
dispositive of the § 7 charge. The court had not considered the procompetitive effects of a
company that is perceived by existing competitors as being a potential entrant. The Court
said that a violation of Clayton Act § 7 might occur when such a perceived potential competi-
tor entered by acquiring a substantial firm since the procompetitive restraining effect that a
competent company "in the wings" has on market members would be lost. Id. at 537-38. The
Supreme Court remanded the case for a consideration under this "perceived potential en-
trant" theory. Id. at 537. The Falstaff court cited Penn-Olin for the proposition that a
company may violate § 7 of the Clayton Act even when there is no proof that the company,
if denied the opportunity to enter by substantial acquisition, would enter de novo or by
toehold acquisition. The Supreme Court had reiterated the Penn-Olin doctrine in FTC v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) on facts similar to those in Falstaff. Proctor &
Gamble, a leader in the manufacture and sale of inexpensive household products, acquired
the assets of Clorox Company, which controlled nearly 50% of the household bleach market.
Id. at 571-74. The Supreme Court found that the purchase violated antitrust laws, holding it
unnecessary to prove that a firm would probably enter de novo or by toehold to determine
that the challenged acquisition or merger would, with "reasonable probability," have some
anticompetitive effect. Id. at 580.
10 In Falstaff, and later in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974),
the Court expressly reserved for later determination the question of whether an actual poten-
tial entrant may be enjoined from entering a market by substantial acquisition. 410 U.S. at
537; 418 U.S. at 639. The Supreme Court in Falstaff hesitated to apply § 7 to a merger that
would not decrease competition, but whose only anticompetitive effect was the absence of
the maximum procompetitive effect. 410 U.S. at 537. In Marine Bancorporation the Court
considered the actual potential entrant theory at length, 418 U.S. at 623-39, but because there
was- no proof that the defendant could have entered the Spokane banking market de novo,
the Court did not resolve the question that .was left open in Falstaff. Id. at 639.
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ure to track the analysis that seems clearly indicated in Penn-Olin and
Falstaff. First, the Fourth Circuit may have felt that the Supreme Court
was justified in requiring reconsideration of the perceived potential entrant
theory in those cases because the government had presented the perceived
potential entrant theory in the trial court, whereas in Arco, the theory was
never raised." While the Supreme Court discussed both theories, however,
it is fairly clear from the lower court opinions that the perceived potential
entrant theory was never raised in either Penn-Olin or Falstaff.42 Second,
the Fourth Circuit may have refused to give the government a second
chance to prove what it had been unsuccessful in proving the first time.
Indeed, district court judges would be required to fill an unaccustomed role
if the Supreme Court intended to influence plaintiffs to raise the perceived
potential entrant theory in all potential competition cases,43 a point dis-
Since Falstaff and Marine Bancorportion, only one case has been decided that seems to
rely solely upon the actual potential entrant theory. See BOC Int. Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24
(2d Cir. 1977). The world's second largest producer of industrial gases, BOC, was ordered by
the FTC to divest itself of its controlling stock in Airco, the third largest domestic producer
of industrial gases. The court specifically sidestepped the perceived potential entrant theory,
noting that no wings or fringe effect had been found below, see note 37 supra, and that this
finding had not been challenged. Furthermore, the Second Circuit made no mention of the
entrenchment theory. See note 13 supra.
The BOC opinion does not disclose whether a § 7 violation occurs when an actual poten-
tial entrant enters a market by substantial acquisition. The court did hold that an allegation
that the charged company is a potential competitor must fix a reasonable time within which
the potential entrant probably will enter de novo. 557 F.2d at 29. The FTC had charged there
was a reasonable probability that BOC "eventually" would have entered the domestic mar-
ket. Id. The Second Circuit ruled that there must be some limitation in time or the standard
would be too nebulous. Id.
The issue of what quantum of proof is necessary to show an actual potential entrant will
enter a market is raised in Arco, 549 F.2d at 295. See Turner, supra note 5, at 1386. The court
of appeals indicated that proof the company would enter de novo must be nearly perfect. This
position is bolstered by the Falstaff Court's reliance upon the self-serving testimony of Fal-
staff officers that they had no intention of entering except by acquisition.
Despite the difficulties noted above, some authorities support the validity of the actual
potential entrant theory. See Turner, supra note 5. Other authorities who seek to avoid the
difficulties suggest that no potential competition theories should be allowed to play a part in
antitrust litigation. See Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM.
L. REv. 282, 323 (1975).
11 549 F.2d at 293 n.6. The court also suggests that the perceived potential entrant theory
is the preferred theory, and that both actual and perceived potential entrant theories were
discussed in Penn-Olin. Id.
42 The trial court in Penn-Olin discussed various possible anticompetitive effects of the
joint venture at length, but never reached the perceived potential entrant theory. United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 122-34 (D. Del. 1963). The government's
case seems to have been based upon the actual potential entrant theory and upon the en-
trenchment. theory. In Falstaff, the trial court's opinion is brief and the perceived potential
entrant theory was not mentioned, 332 F. Supp. 970 (D.R.I. 1971). Two justices of the Su-
preme Court stated unequivocally that the perceived potential entrant theory had not been
argued below. 410 U.S. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring), 572-76 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"3 Even the most recent cases treat the various characterizations of anticompetitive effect
as separate theories. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F.
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cussed by Justice Rehnquist in his Falstaff dissent." Undeniably, however,
a majority in both Penn-Olin and Falstaff voted to remand for considera-
tion of an issue that almost certainly was not raised in the lower courts.45
The Fourth Circuit, recognizing that the status of potential competi-
tion theories is unsettled, carefully analyzed the question of proof of an
actual potential entrant charge, and probably would have been willing to
grant an injunction had better proof been presented. In so deciding, how-
ever, the Fourth Circuit may have acted in derogation of the Supreme
Court's goals for antitrust litigation." A better course might have been to
remand for reconsideration of the perceived potential entrant theory as the
Supreme Court did in Penn-Olin and Falstaff.4" While such a disposition
would not answer the objections of Justice Rehnquist in Falstaff,4" it is
informed by the recent tendency of the Supreme Court to require analysis
of the precise, provable anticompetitive effects of merger and acquisition
in oligopolistic markets.
The lesson of Arco is that potential competition cases should not be
presented on the actual potential entrant theory alone. Although the
Fourth Circuit probably would grant relief in an ideal actual potential
entrant case, the ambiguous status of that theory, and the Supreme
Court's requirement of full analysis of anticompetitive effects, indicate
that future plaintiffs should raise all possible theories of anticompetitive
effect.
Supp. 1249, 1285 (N.D. Ohio 1977). A more parsimonious explanation of'the relationship
between the theories is that there is simply one theory of potential competition, and the
Supreme Court does not actually require any particular characterization of the anti-
competitive effect, but prefers instead a factual, rather than theoretical, analysis of the
anticompetitive effect. The case that comes closest to testing acquisition under a general
potential competition theory is Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1976), where
the court upheld the FTC's finding of a § 7 violation because the acquisition would contribute
to a tendency towards concentration. Id. at 306.
Beatrice Foods, a multinational corporation which had already acquired Tip Top Brush
Co., a leading manufacturer of paint brushes and rollers, attempted to acquire Essex Graham
Co., a manufacturer of paint rollers. Id. The administrative law judge's cease and desist order,
upheld by both the FTC and the Seventh Circuit, was based on a determination that Essex
was the most likely entrant into the brush market, and that the acquisition would prevent
Essex from becoming a competitor in that market. No mention was made of the perceived
potential entrant theory. Beatrice Foods appears to be an actual potential entrant case in
which the court did not require absolute proof that Essex would enter the brush market. The
Seventh Circuit did not follow the actual potential entrant analysis, however, and finally held
that Beatrice Foods would be forced to divest itself of Essex simply because the paint brush
market already tended towards concentration. Id.
1' 410 U.S. at 572 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'5 See note 42 supra.
48 The Supreme Court's closer analysis of the actual anticompetitive effects of a chal-
lenged merger or acquisition is noted in Shenefield, supra note 5, at 323, and in Robinson,
Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 243, 243-60 (1975). See note 31 and
accompanying text, supra.
' See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
48 See text accompanying note 44 supra.
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B. Immunities
Certain activities that might constitute illegal restraint of trade are
immune from prosecution because they are important to the economy or
public policy.' One such immunity is granted a state acting as a sovereign.
2
The seminal case granting states immunity from antitrust prosecution
is Parker v. Brown.' In Parker, the Supreme Court held that a state agent
is exempt from prosecution under antitrust laws when the state, acting as
sovereign, commands the agent to act in violation of antitrust laws.4 While
the Court in Parker proffered guidelines for applying what has come to be
known as Parker-type, or state action, immunity,5 subsequent courts have
I Sections 7 & 8 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 19 (1970) exempt from antitrust
laws conduct ordered by the Federal Reserve Board, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the United States Maritime Com-
mission, and the Secretary of Agriculture. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, 15
U.S.C. § 1011 (1970) exempts the business of insurance from federal antitrust laws.
Further exemptions have been granted where the restraint of trade is the result of govern-
mental action, see, e.g., Heath v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 325 F. Supp. 223 (D. Colo. 1971) (U.S.
Forest Service allowed only one ski school to operate in each ski area), where the conduct is
mandated by the government, see, e.g., Gibson & Perin Co. v. Cincinnati, 480 F.2d 936 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973)(cooperation between city and private business in
urban renewal program does not violate antitrust laws), and where the charge is against a
utility operated under rigid state regulation. See, e.g., Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 339 F. Supp. 1391 (E.D. Va. 1972), aff'd 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973)
(strictly regulated telephone company refused to allow private answering service to connect
to phone company equipment). Similarly, exemptions exist where the concerted activity is
only for the purpose of lobbying, see Eastern R.R. Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and in actions
pursuant to governmental agricultural marketing programs. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943)(state legislature limited competition among state fruit growers in order to
protect fruit prices); see note 3 infra.
I States have been found to have a sovereign interest in the value of the state's agricul-
tural products, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943), the regulation of the practice
of law, Goldfarb v. State Bar of Va., 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977), and in the protection of the state's consumers from unfair pricing
practices, DaVinci Art Galleries, Ltd. v. New York, [1977-2] TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,385
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
317 U.S. 341 (1943). The California legislature passed the Agricultural Prorate Act
directing the State Department of Agriculture to organize and supervise a program which
would restrict competition among the state's fruit growers for the purpose of maintaining fruit
prices. Id. at 346. Plaintiffs alleged that the price-fixing violated antitrust law. The court
found that the actions of the State Department of Agriculture, because they were compelled
by the state acting as sovereign, would be exempt from antitrust prosecution. Id. at 352.
The Supreme Court cited Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904) (state pilotage laws are
valid although they interfere with free competition), and Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908
(C.C.D.S.C. 1895)(state liquor laws are valid although they interfere with free competition)
in concluding that state action immunity existed. 317 U.S. at 352. Thus, the state action
immunity doctrine actually predates the Parker decision by at least forty-eight years See
Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1976).
1 317 U.S. at 350-51.
5 A state may not immunize an action simply by authorizing it. 317 U.S. at 351; see,
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reviewed the doctrine in light of new facts and attempted to define its
contours.'
The Fourth Circuit considered the current status of Parker-type im-
munity in City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hospital Association.7 In Fairfax,
Fairfax Hospital had agreed with Doctors Hospital to purchase all of the
latter hospital's assets. When the acquisition was proposed, the County
Board, using its legislatively granted powers, 8 created the Industrial Devel-
opment Authority (IDA) to raise money by bond issue, purchase Doctors
Hospital's assets, and lease the assets to Fairfax Hospital The City of
Fairfax and seven area doctors sought an injunction in the district court
against the proposed acquisition,"0 stating that since there were only two
hospitals in Fairfax County, the leasing arrangement would put all local
hospital services in the same hands. The plaintiffs charged that such unity
of control would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act by eliminating com-
petition between Fairfax Hospital and Doctors Hospital." The plaintiffs
also charged that the proposed arrangement would monopolize interstate
commerce in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
2
e.g., United States v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal.), cert.
dismissed, 414 U.S. 801 (1973) (state action not immune when state public utility commission
approved, but did not encourage or direct, merger of two intrastate airlines). Immunity may
not exist even where a state or a municipality participates with private parties in activities
in restraint of trade. 317 U.S. at 351-52, citing Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S.
450 (1941) (no immunity existed where city, cooperating with carrier, established terminal
and convinced other dealers to market goods in newly established terminal). Before immunity
is granted, state action must be designed to give effect to vital state concerns, 317 U.S. at
368, see text accompanying notes 31-34 infra. Finally, the Supreme Court noted that immun-
ity will not be granted if the state, through its agents, has not exercised control over private
actions to protect the public from injuries that usually occur when the pressures of competi-
tion and the antitrust laws are removed. 317 U.S. at 352; see, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (no
immunity existed where state's approval of building specifications allowed companies to gain
monopoly in swimming pool construction because state regulations not designed to counteract
the ill-effects of monopoly). For a discussion of state regulation with specific reference to
federal antitrust laws, see Comment, Alabama Power Company v. Alabama Electric Coopera-
tive: Rural Electrification and the Antitrust Laws-Irresistible Force Meets Immovable
Object, 55 VA. L. REv. 325, 352-55 (1969).
Shenefield, supra Trade Regulation, Section A, note 5, at 289 n.138.
562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977), filed for cert., 46 U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1977)(No.
77-826).
a VA. CODE §§ 15.1-1375 (1976 Cum. Supp.) provides in pertinent part: "it is the intent
of the legislature . . . to authorize . . . industrial development authorities . . . [who] may
acquire, own, lease, and dispose of properties... for the benefit of the inhabitants... through
the increase of their commerce or through the promotion of their safety, health, welfare,
convenience, or prosperity."
562 F.2d at 282-83.
" Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), states that "any person ... shall
be entitled to sue for.., injunctive relief... against threatened loss or damage by a violation
of the antitrust laws .
" Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); see Trade Regulation, Section A, note 2 supra.
12 562 F.2d at 283. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) states that "[e]very person
who shall . . . attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other persons, to
monopolize [interstate commerce] ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
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Fairfax Hospital Association, Commonwealth Doctors Hospital, and
the IDA argued in their defense that the district court lacked jurisdiction
to consider the case because there was an insufficient showing of interstate
commerce,'3 and because the plaintiffs, having proven no injury, did not
have standing.'4 The defendants further argued that they were entitled to
state action immunity under Parker because they had been compelled by
the state acting as sovereign.'"
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment, agreeing that there was insufficient evidence of interstate com-
merce. Moreover, the trial court concluded that the IDA was a state agency
created by a subordinate unit of state government pursuant to law and in
the spirit of the law. Thus, the IDA was held to be an instrument of valid
state policy, and the hospitals, although private corporations, were con-
trolled by the IDA in the transaction.'"
The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that these arguments were insuffi-
cient to support summary judgment on the basis of Parker. The court
found that although the state and its agents monitored the activities of the
two private hospitals, there was no proof that the state legislature had in
any way required or compelled the concentrated ownership of the hospi-
'" The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that there was insufficient
evidence of interstate commerce. 562 F.2d at 283, citing Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex
Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976) reversing 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court said
in Rex Hospital that the district court had erred in summarily adjudging that the court lacked
jurisdiction on the basis of an incomplete record. 425 U.S. at 746. Federal jurisdiction over
cases involving restraint of interstate commerce is granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
The Supreme Court has defined the term "interstate commerce" inclusively so that very few
businesses can escape prosecution under the Sherman Act on the grounds that they do not
affect interstate commerce. See Schnapp's Shop, Inc. v. H. W. Wright & Co., 377 F. Supp.
570 (D. Md. 1974)(scope of Sherman Act is as broad as Congress' interstate power; only the
most local transactions are beyond reach of Sherman Act).
" Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), enables plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief
upon a showing of threatened injury. Plaintiffs achieve standing to sue for injunction by
demonstrating a significant threat of injury due to incipient violation of antitrust laws, or a
present violation that is likely to continue or recur. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). Compare Nelson v. Pacific Sw. Airlines, 399 F. Supp. 1025 (S.D.
Cal. 1975) with Sum of Squares, Inc. v. Market Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). In Nelson, the court held that the proper test of standing was not whether the plaintiff
had suffered injury, but whether he had proved a threat of injury caused by impending or
continuing antitrust violation, 399 F. Supp. at 1025-30. On the other hand, the Sum of
Squares court denied plaintiff a mandatory injunction compelling the release of certain infor-
mation because the plaintiff had failed to show irreparable harm would occur before a suit
on the merits could be had. 401 F. Supp. at 59-60.
, During congressional debate over the Sherman Antitrust Act, the bill's sponsor said
that the purpose of the bill was to thwart "business combinations." 21 CONG. REc. 2562
(Remarks of Senator Sherman). See Id. at 2457, 2459, 2461. The Supreme Court cited Senator
Sherman's language in Parker, finding that the acts of an agent or officer of the state are
immune from prosecution under the antitrust laws when those acts are directed by the state
acting as sovereign. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
" City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hospital Ass'n, [1976-2] TRADE CASE (CCH) 1 60,999, at
69,424 (E.D. Va. 1976).
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tals.'7 With regard to the claim that the IDA was an agent acting at the
command of the state, the court responded that a command from a politi-
cal subdivision of the state does not "automatically satisfy the conditions
precedent" under which an agency may invoke antitrust immunity. The
court stated that the ordinance of the County Board was not a coercive
command of the legislature, nor was it a legislative attempt to regulate
private conduct.'" Although the court characterized the ordinance as a
"firm direction" from the Board to the IDA, 9 the court emphasized that
the Board, rather than the state, was the source of the direction. 20 Since
the command upon which it acted did not come from the state legislature,
the DA was not an agent of the state. The Fourth Circuit remanded with
the warning that while the record developed at the preliminary stage of
litigation did not support a claim of state action immunity, a full trial upon
the merits could well show that the state or the county had an existing
regulatory interest in hospital ownership.2'
Judge Widener concurred in the court's decision to remand, but aug-
mented the majority's instructions to the district court by arguing that the
district court should apply the two-part test22 propounded by the Supreme
Court in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 2 under which a private party might
be granted state action antitrust immunity. Judge Widener first noted that
Cantor requires a threshold showing that the party claiming state action
immunity was compelled by the state acting as sovereign. 4 The test for
compulsion is strict, requiring proof that if the party seeking immunity had
obeyed state law, he necessarily would have violated the antitrust laws.
,7 562 F.2d at 284.
, Id. at 285. Fourth Circuit cited Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) for
the proposition that the command will not necessarily trigger antitrust immunity if it came
from a subordinate arm of state government. In Goldfarb the legislature had given power to
the Virginia Supreme Court to control the practice of law in the state. Rules published by
the Virginia Supreme Court sanctioned local fee schedules. The enforcement of fee schedules
by the state and county bar associations was found not to have been compelled by the state
since neither the legislature nor the Supreme Court mandated acquiescence in the fee sched-
ules. 421 U.S. at 790-91.
,1 562 F.2d at 285.
20 Id.
21 Id.
2 Id. at 286-87 (Widener, J., concurring).
- 428 U.S. 579 (1976). Cantor involved, a private, state regulated power company that
had initiated a policy of supplying several standard sizes of light bulbs to its customers free
of charge. The rates, which were approved by the state and which could not be changed
without the state's permission, included the cost of light bulbs. The service was a benefit to
the customers, but retailers who could not compete with the power company brought suit.
The Court found that state approval and control of the rates did not constitute a command
to a private party, id. at 594, that the state interest in electrical service for the citizens of
the state did not require the distribution of cheap light bulbs, id. at 595, and that the
anticompetitive acts complained of were not necessary to the functioning of the regulatory
scheme. Id. at 596.
21 The requirement that a plaintiff make a threshold showing of compulsion appears in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 780 (1975), see note 18 supra.
5 See Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust Enforcement Under the Federal
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If no such compulsion is found, the court need not investigate the validity
of the claim further." If compulsion is found, Judge Widener asserted that
Cantor required that both elements of a two-part test be satisfied before
state action immunity would be applicable.Y
According to Cantor, a private party must show first, in addition to
compulsion, that he has not participated in the state's decision-making
process." Where the private party has exercised sufficient freedom of
choice in the formulation and execution of the challenged behavior, the
effect of the compulsion is negated, and the behavior will enjoy immun-
ity.29 Judge Widener reiterated that the record would not resolve this
"fairness" issue.
30
If there is compulsion and the private party has not participated in the
decision-making process, Cantor requires proof under the second part of
its test that the state has a strong, clearly articulated interest in regulating
a certain activity.3' Judge Widener's concurring opinion implies that a
Trade Commission Act, 89 HARv. L. REV. 715 (1976). The notion that compulsion may only
be found when the charged party cannot possibly obey both state and federal law received
support from Cantor where compulsion was found because the electricity rates could not be
changed without the state's permission. 428 U.S. at 595. Thus, even if the defendant had
wanted to abandon the sale of light bulbs and change rates in order to obey the antitrust laws,
it could not have done so without violating state law unless it had first gained state approval.
Id. at 594.
28 421 U.S. at 790; accord Almeda Mall, Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., [1977-
11 TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,485 (S.D. Tex. 1977)(state action immunity defense dismissed
because power company not compelled to deny shopping center owners the right to resell
electricity to store owners).
27 Several courts subsequent to Cantor have followed the Supreme Court in going beyond
the "threshold inquiry" defined by Goldfarb, see note 24 supra, and provide authority for
Judge Widener's argument that the Cantor tests apply to private parties. See Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977)(disciplinary rule of Arizona Supreme Court banning
advertising by attorneys found to be compulsion; Court considered Arizona State Bar's role
in having rule promulgated, and extent to which rule conflicted with antitrust law); cf.,
Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977)(nega-
tive answer to Goldfarb "threshold inquiry" of whether compulsion exists terminates analysis
of state action immunity, but affirmative showing of compulsion requires further analysis
relating to incompatibility of State Bar Association regulations and federal antitrust laws).
See generally Shores, The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb and Cantor, 63 IOWA L. REv.
367 (1977). But see City of Mishawaka v. Indiana and Mich. Elec. Co., [1977-2] TRADE CAsES
(CCH) 61,587 (7th Cir. 1977)(where compulsion not found, court must consider the case
according to tests prescribed in Cantor).
428 U.S. at 592-93.
21 Id. at 593. The Supreme Court's present approach to the "unfairness" doctrine may
be traced at least as far back as the pre-Parker case of Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313
U.S. 450 (1941). In Union Pacific the Court said that while railroads may properly cooperate
with cities to further municipal interests, the railroad may not use that cooperation as a shield
against competition. 313 U.S. at 463-68.
3' 562 F.2d at 287. (Widener, J., concurring). The lower court would have to determine
on remand the degree of state interest in hospital ownership and the extent to which private
initiative was responsible for the decision of the county board to create the IDA. Id.
21 Id. (Widener, J., concurring), citing Cantor, 428 U.S. at 592. For an analysis of the
second Cantor test, see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 234-38 (1976).
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compelling state interest may be found if the state is protecting legitimate
interests,3 2 if the legislature has articulated its intent to supervene federal
antitrust laws,3 and if enforcement of those laws would disrupt the existing
state regulatory scheme. 4 If compliance with federal antitrust laws would
interfere unduly with valid state regulation, then state regulation should
be given precedence and the antitrust laws should not be enforced.
3
1
When Judge Widener applied the "fairness" part of the Cantor test in
analyzing the extent and effect of the defendant hospitals' participation
in the decision-making process, he found the record insufficient to deter-
mine whether the hospitals would lose their immunity because of their
participation." Under the "state interest" part of the Cantor test, Judge
Widener could not find evidence of the state's intent to supervene antitrust
law by allowing counties to purchase hospitals, nor did he believe that such
The writer suggests that courts cannot be sure how to apply the two-part Cantor test since
the light bulb scheme failed both parts of the test. The state had not initiated the program,
nor did it have any sovereign interest in maintaining the program. Thus, it is unclear whether
an action will be immune if it satisfies only one of the two standards. Id. at 235.
31 562 F.2d at 287 (Widener, J., concurring). Applying the second Cantor test, Judge
Widener first looked to see if hospital ownership was the type of state interest on which an
immunity might be based. He mentioned that the Supreme Court had found that the regula-
tion of the state bar is a legitimate state interest, citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.
Ct. 2691 (1977), and that health and safety may be one of those areas in which states should
exercise strong control. 562 F.2d at 287 (Widener, J., concurring). Judge Hall agreed with
Judge Widener that the state's interest in health and welfare should be given great weight in
deciding whether or not immunity should be granted. Id. at 288-90 (Hall, J., concurring and
dissenting).
" The second element of the Cantor state interest test requires proof that the legislature
intended to engage in anticompetitive acts. The intent to supervene federal antitrust law is
most easily found when a state creates an agency and concurrently authorizes the agency to
engage in anticompetitive behavior while performing legislatively mandated tasks. See
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966). See
generally Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (W.D. Pa. 1969). Where
no specific statutory language authorizes anticompetitive behavior, courts look to the actions
of the state, and to its interest in the regulation. An activity may be held immune to antitrust
litigation where state action is necessary or important to protect valid state interests, where
evidence exists that the legislature considered the anticompetitive effects of the action, where
the directive from the state to its agent or subordinate has been specific, and where there
are opportunities for judicial review of any actions taken pursuant to the government's direc-
tion. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1047 (1972). See generally Note, Parker v. Brown-Gone to Hecht: A New Test for State
Action Exemptions, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (1973); Note, Antitrust Immunity-Re-evaluation
and Synthesis of Parker v. Brown-Intent, State Action, Causation, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 1245
(1973).
" The established rule governing the reconciling of anticompetitive state or federal regu-
latory schemes with antitrust law is set forth in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S.
341 (1963). The Silver Court said that repeal of the antitrust laws would be regarded as
implied only if necessary to make the regulatory scheme work, "and then only to the mini-
mum extent necessary." Id. at 357. In Cantor, the Court cites this language, finding that the
light bulb distribution scheme was an antitrust violation. 428 U.S. at 597.
562 F.2d at 288 (Widener, J., concurring), citing Cantor, 428 U.S. at 597.
' 562 F.2d at 287.
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a plan, if it existed, would be necessary to accomplish the public service
goals of the state. 7
Up to this point in his analysis, Judge Widener accurately applied the
Supreme Court's current analytical treatment of Parker-type immunity.
The next step of his analysis, however, proposed a test for subordinate
units of state government that is different from the test for private parties
he applied to the defendant hospitals. Judge Widener's test, derived from
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.," deals with an aspect
of the state action antitrust immunity doctrine on which the Supreme
Court has not announced a position. In Lafayette, the Fifth Circuit decided
that a subordinate political subdivision, such as a city or county, would
not be exempted automatically from the operation of antitrust laws, but
that, unlike private parties, subordinate governmental units might be ex-
empted if their actions are within the state's legislative intent. 9 The
Lafayette court found that a specific legislative command was not neces-
sary if the state had given authority to a governmental entity to operate
in a particular area."° Judge Widener noted that the Lafayette test takes
the place of the compulsion element of the Cantor test4 but stated that
the two-part test of private participation in the decision-making process
and articulated state interest still will apply.4" Presumably, Fairfax County
would not lose its immunity simply because it cooperated with a private
party. Consequently, Judge Widener must have intended that the second
part of the Cantor test, the articulated state interest portion, would be the
applicable part. Again he finds the record an insufficient basis for judg-
ment, but agrees with Judge Hall that the state's natural interest in the
health of the community should be weighed heavily in determining
whether defendant Fairfax County should be exempted from the operation
of antitrust laws. 3
Judge Widener's concurring opinion was offered primarily as an explan-
ation of the majority's demand that a fuller record be developed in the
district court. His Cantor analysis was not meant to contradict any of the
majority's reasoning, but only to give direction to the district court's reex-
' Id. at 287-88.
532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1577 (1977). Louisiana Power
Co., responding to antitrust charges brought by the City of Lafayette, counterclaimed that
the city had itself violated antitrust laws. The trial court held that the city was automati-
cally exempt from antitrust prosecution under Parker because it was a political subdivision.
The Fifth Circuit reversed.
3, Id. at 434, 436.
11 Id. The Third and Seventh Circuits also have pronounced that a subordinate arm of
state government might be immunized from the operation of antitrust laws if a mandate for
the challenged activities "may be inferred from the nature of the powers and duties given to
a particular government entity." Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway, 557 F.2d 580, 590 (7th Cir.
1977), filed for cert., 46 U.S.L.W. 3285 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1977) (No. 77-446) quoting Duke &
Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1280 (3d Cir. 1975).





amination of the facts of the case. His proposal that the district court test
the defendant Fairfax County according to the Lafayette test, however,
represents a distinct disagreement with the majority position, reflecting a
wide-ranging argument over the scope of Parker-type immunity. The Su-
preme Court's recent disapproval of the Lafayette test resolves dispute on
the issue of immunity of political subdivisions. Counties and cities must
prove compulsion just as a private party must.
44
Another form of antitrust immunity, granted to rate bureaus of the
commercial carrier industry, was the subject of Motor Carriers Traffic
Association v. United States.45 In that case, the Fourth Circuit reviewed
an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) Modifying the
conditions under which antitrust immunity might be accorded rate bur-
eaus. Rate bureaus are organizations of commercial carrier companies that
analyze the transportation needs of a geographic area, coordinate service
in that area, and report routes and rates to the ICC for approval. 6 These
bureaus, or "rate conferences," exist because Congress, while recognizing
the necessity of providing the nation with dependable, varied, and efficient
commercial transportation systems, at the same time recognized the ex-
treme difficulty of organizing and administering such systems. Congress
therefore authorized rate bureaus to do most of this regulatory work and
gave the ICC oversight powers. 47 Because many of the agreements among
carriers would violate antitrust laws, the ICC was empowered to exempt
the rate bureaus from the operation of antitrust laws."
Motor Carriers was an appeal from an order of the ICC imposing new
restrictions upon the immunity grant.49 One of the new restrictions, which
denies antitrust immunity to a rate bureau if it protests a bureau member's
proposal to act independently of the bureau, reverses former ICC policy
and favors the independent actions of individual shipping companies. The
11 City of Lafayettte v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 46 U.S.L.W. 4265, 4272 (U.S. Mar.
29, 1978) (No. 76-864).
45 559 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1977).
1' Collective rate-making had been a controversial practice of the surface transportation
industry for many years, id. at 1253, before § 5a of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948, Pub. L.
No. 662, 62 Stat. 472 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5b(1970)), granted the ICC power to immunize
the practice from antitrust prosecution.
11 H. R. REP. No. 1100, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1948] U.S. CODE CON(. &
AD. NEWS 1844, 1845-48, 1849-54.
4 The ICC, by authority of 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9)(1970), could grant antitrust immunity to
rate bureaus to the extent that they furthered the National Transportation Policy, estab-
lished in 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1970). This preamble states that Congress seeks to develop
and coordinate a transportation system that gives fair rates and effective service to the public,
and meets-the needs of the federal governments. Id.
1' The ICC ruled that agreements of rate bureaus would no longer be granted antitrust
immunity under 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1970) if the bureaus protest the independent action proposals
of any of their member carriers, if any member carriers that have an effect upon rate-making
are affiliated with shippers, or if the bureaus involved are operating as profit-making entities.
Ex Parte No. 297, Rate Bureau Investigation, 349 I.C.C. 811, 852-53 (1973). One of the
plaintiffs, Rocky Mountain Motor Traffic Bureau, has filed for certiorari. 46 U.S.L.W. 3374
(U.S. Nov. 25, 1977) (No. 77-755).
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ICC formerly believed that the protests of rate bureaus kept the ICC in-
formed and contributed to a full and free discussion of the issues." The
ICC's policy change, pursuant to power granted it in the Reed-Bulwinkle
Act,5 was based upon the belief that rate bureau protests chilled indepen-
dent action, and that the national transportation policy would be better
served by encouraging independent action than by allowing rate bureau
protest.52
Motor Carriers Traffic Association, which had protested independent
actions and therefore would have its immunity revoked by the ICC under
the new policy, brought suit against the ICC to challenge the action.5 The
Fourth Circuit upheld the new policies,54 finding that the ICC's order was
within the Commission's power5 and in accordance with statutory proce-
dures." The court concluded that the ICC's reversal of policy was not
"arbitrary and capricious,"57 and that the rate bureau's first amendment
I For years the ICC has read 49 U.S.C. § 316e (1970), which states that "[amny person,
State Board, organization, or body politic" may protest any rate proposal possibly in violation
of 49 U.S.C. § 317 (1970), to mean that rate bureaus should be able to protest the individual
proposals of carrier members. This rationale is best expressed in Southern Motor Carriers-
Agreement, 297 I.C.C. 603, 616 (1956) where the Commission emphasized the rate bureaus'
part in investigating complex elements of a transportation system, resolving difficult issues,
and keeping the ICC informed. Attempts by carrier members to insert language into their
rate bureau charters depriving the bureaus of the right to protest were blocked by the ICC,
applying the principles expressed in Southern Motor Carriers. See Rocky Mountain Carriers
-Agreement, 302 I.C.C. 569, 575 (1958); Motor Carriers Traffic Ass'n, Inc.-Agreement,
301 I.C.C. 781, 785-86 (1957); Southern Carriers Rate Conf. Inc. v. Central Motor Lines,
Inc., 300 I.C.C. 317, 318 (1957).
51 49 U.S.C. 5b(8)(1970) provides in pertinent part that "[t]he Commission is author-
ized . . . after . . . investigation . . . [to] terminate or modify its approval of such [rate
bureau] agreement and shall modify the terms and conditions upon which such approval was
granted to the extent it finds necessary to insure conformity with such standard and other
provisions of this section."
11 349 I.C.C. at 841-45. Prohibition against rate bureau protest has been legislatively
sought, and the rate bureau protest of independent actions is "generally acknowledged to be
a questionable practice which seriously discourages carriers from exercising their right of
independent action and tends to perpetuate a ratemaking oligarchy by the bureaus." Barrett,
Regulation-The Winds of Change, 42 ICC PRAc. J. 560, 564 (1975).
559 F.2d at 1254.
51 Id. at 1256.
" 559 F.2d at 1254-55; see note 51 supra.
" 559 F.2d at 1253-54. 49 U.S.C. § 5b(8)(1970) requires that all interested parties be
given a reasonable opportunity by the ICC for a hearing on the matter of rate bureau approval
and antitrust immunity. After proper notice and hearing, id., the ICC issued its order modify-
ing the immunity grant. 349 I.C.C. at 861.
11 559 F.2d at 1255. The "arbitrary or capricious" standard of review of federal agency
actions is established in 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(A) (1976) which states that "[tihe reviewing court
shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbi-
trary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." See
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974)(scope
of review under "arbitrary and capricious" standard is narrow, limited to consideration
whether agency considered relevant factors and whether there was clear error in judgment;
Supeme Court will "uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may be
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rights would not be violated by the prohibition of protests against indepen-
dent action proposals of carrier members."
Because the scope of judicial review of an agency order is quite narrow,
a conclusion that Motor Cariers is an indicator of the Fourth Circuit's
current approach toward antitrust enforcement in general, or antitrust
immunity in particular, would be unfounded. While the decision of the
ICC to restrict rate bureau protest is a clear sign of that agency's adherence
to the principles of free competition, the Fourth Circuit was bound to
approve the agency order unless alarming improprieties were discovered in
the agency's procedure.
C. Enforcement
Since antitrust policy is directed toward protection of the economy as
a whole,' violations of antitrust laws may produce injuries to large numbers
of people. The class action device and the doctrine of parens patriae,
because they permit the simultaneous adjudication of a great many related
claims, may enhance the efficient and effective enforcement of the anti-
trust statutes. In two recent cases the Fourth Circuit examined the circum-
stances that make these procedures appropriate.
Power to enforce the federal antitrust laws is shared by the federal
government, state governments, and private citizens.2 Often, however, the
injury is so slight that the expense of litigation is too great to justify a
reasonably discerned"); accord, United States v. Central Truck Lines, Inc., 548 F.2d 523, 524
(5th Cir. 1977).
51 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(B)(1970) allows the reviewing court to set aside agency orders that
are unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit felt in Motor Carriers, however, that the ICC was
justified in putting some restriction upon the rate bureaus' freedom to protest in order to
encourage independent actions. 559 F.2d at 1255. The rate bureaus complained that § 216(e)
of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 316(e)(1970) gives them a constitutional right
to protest. 559 F.2d at 1254. While the statute gives "[a]ny person, state board, organization,
or body politic" the right to protest actions and proposals that may violate § 217 of the Act,
49 U.S.C. § 317 (1970), there is no indication that this right rises to the level of the first
amendment right of free speech. The ICC has not absoultely denied rate bureaus the right to
protest, but merely has made the granting of antitrust immunity contingent upon the bur-
eaus' not protesting. Furthermore, a rate bureau still may direct one of its sympathetic
members to protest individual actions.
I See REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-43 (1941); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,4 (1958).
2 Provisions of the Sherman Act are enforced by the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice which may initiate civil, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970), and criminal, 15 U.S.C. §§
1,2 (1970), proceedings, and by private parties, who may sue for equitable remedies, 15 U.S.C.
§ 26 (1970), and for treble damages, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The Clayton Act is enforced by
the Antitrust Division, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970), by private paties, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15,26 (1970),
and by the Federal Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970). See generally SULLIVAN, supra
Trade Regulation, Section A, note 32, at § § 240-53; POSNER, supra Trade Regulation, Section
A, note 8, at 31-35, 221-36.
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private lawsuit.' The class action procedure outlined by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 231 allows a large number of antitrust plaintiffs to join
together against a common defendant.' Although this procedure may be
more efficient in terms of judicial time than a series of single suits, the
courts will not allow a class action to proceed if it is so unmanageable that
this efficiency is destroyed! The circumstances that make a class action
unmanageable are now coming under close judicial scrutiny.
The plaintiffs in Windham v. American Brands, Inc.7 were six named
sellers of flue-cured tobacco who offered their tobacco for sale at auction.
The defendant tobacco buyers were charged in the complaint with conspir-
ing to fix prices, rig bids, and monopolize the market by agreeing among
themselves to divide the market and bid collectively. The complaint al-
leged that these actions were taken with the knowledge and acquiescence
of the Secretary of Agriculture, also named as a defendant.' The complaint
further charged that the buyers and the Secretary of Agriculture had con-
spired to restrict the pace of tobacco sales in the auction warehouses
The plaintiffs moved the district court to certify the action as a class
action under Rule 23 on behalf of all South Carolinians having an interest
in the sale at auction of flue-cured tobacco." The district judge permitted
full discovery on the issue of class certification alone, and concluded that
the named plaintiffs had satisfied the Rule 23(a) criteria for the certifying
of a class action suit by showing that they were capable representatives of
numerous potential plaintiffs, all of whose claims depended upon a com-
mon question of law or fact." The district court found, however, that the
16 M VON KALINOWSKI, supra Trade Regulation, Section A, note 32 at §
108.01[2](1977).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
Rule 23 was amended in 1966 so that each person in the class described In the complaint
automatically became a member of the litigating class unless he chose to "opt out." See Notes
of the Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rules, FED. R. Cn'. P. 23. Consumers took
the opportunity to enforce antitrust laws by forming classes with millions of members, even
though this result may not have been intended by the draftsmen of the amendment. Handler
& Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and a
Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626, 627 (1976).
1 See H.R. REP. No. 94-499-Part 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1976), reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2575-78 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].




, There were six named plaintiffs, growers of flue-cured tobacco in South Carolina,
seeking to represent more than 20,000 South Carolinians who, from 1970 through 1974, sold
or had an economic interest in the sale of flue-cured tobacco in South Carolina, and whose
aggregated claims amounted to more than $335,000,000. 539 F.2d at 1018.
" In holding that this action met the requirements of FED. R. Cw. P. 23(a), the district
court found that there was no question that joinder of all 20,000 members of the class would
be impossible, there were common questions of law and fact, and the typicality and represen-
tativeness of the named plaintiffs could be reconciled without destruction of the class. The
court suggested that the provision for sub-classes in Rule 23(c)(4)(B) be used to separate
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requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) had not been satisfied because plaintiffs had
not proved that common issues would predominate over individual ones,,2
or that any workable formula could be devised that would specify the
actual damage suffered by individual class members.'3 The court dismissed
all complainants except the six named plaintiffs, entered final judgment
against those dismissed, 4 and certified" the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
A three judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
refusal to certify the class action." The circuit court reasoned that section
16(a) of the commerce and trade laws'" evidenced Congress's interest in a
policy favoring the victims of antitrust violations.8 Section 16(a) states
that when a court renders a final judgment in an antitrust suit brought by
the United States that the defendant has violated antitrust law, any other
party bringing an action against the same defendant may use the earlier
judgment as prima facie evidence as to any matters which would be subject
to estoppel as between the parties thereto. The court felt that by analogy
opposing views and eliminate antagonists so the provisions of Rule 23(a) could be met.
Although the court noted the availability of the opt-out provisions of Rule 23(c)(2), it specifi-
cally rejected application of this rule to remedy the specific problems of this case. Windham
v. American Brands, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 641, 648-50 (D.S.C. 1975), affl'd, No. 75-2315 (4th Cir.
filed Oct. 11, 1977); see 10 IDAHO L. Rlv. 287 (1974). See generally 16 M VON KALINOWSKI,
supra Trade Regulation, Section A, note 32, at §§ 108.02, 108.03.
" The district court found that evaluation of the relationship between the common and
individual issues indicated the criteria for Rule 23(b)(3) could not be met. 68 F.R.D. at 655.
See generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACcE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1778
(1972). This conclusion was based on findings relating to the large amount of evidence which
would be required to prove the fact of impact of the alleged conspiracy on each of the 20,000
proposed members of the class and the facts of the specific damage each had sustained. 68
F.R.D. at 653-55.
23 68 F.R.D. at 654.
24 Id. at 660. The court further noted that no expert could qualify to give opinions
concerning all the damage issues in the case. Thus, the district court concluded that a great
amount of evidence would be required to prove damages for each member of the class. The
court rejected the idea of bifurcating the action because the problems of manageability as to
determination of damages were such that plaintiffs claim of a class action should be denied.
Id. at 658-59.
11 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(1970). The Fourth Circuit found that the lower court did not draw
a sufficiently sharp distinction between issues of the alleged violation of the antitrust laws
and issues concerning damages. The appellate court noted that the antagonisms of interest
among the plaintiffs would not prove that defendants did or did not conspire, but would bear
chiefly upon the measures of the impacts of the conspiracies, if any existed. 539 F.2d at 1021-
22.
" 559 F.2d 1016, 1022, rev'd on rehearing, No. 75-2315 (4th Cir. filed Oct. 11, 1977). See
generally Trade Regulation, Fourth Circuit Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 427, 788-91
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Fourth Circuit].
15 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1970).
" 539 F.2d at 1021. The basis for the policy of simplifying antitrust litigation appears to
be congressional sympathy for the usually small enterprise or individual against the ordinar-
ily large malefactor. See generally M. GREEN, B. MOORE & B. WISSERSTEIN, THE CLOSED
ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 215 (1972); Winthrow & Larm, The "Big" Antitrust Case: 25 Years of
Sisyphean Labor, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 24 (1976)[hereinafter cited a Winthrow & Larm].
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to section 16(a), two trials might be held in this class action suit: one to
determine whether a violation had occurred, and, if a violation were found,
another to determine the amount of damages.19
The Fourth Circuit heard the case again en banc, and reversed the
panel's decision, this time holding that the district court had refused origi-
nally to certify the class action because of manageability problems,"0 and
that unless the appeals court could identify some abuse of discretion, the
district court's determination should stand." The appellate court also
noted that the section 16(a)-type bifurcated trial would not be feasible
since there was no way to separate the facts that proved violation from the
facts that proved injury.?
The Fourth Circuit's final disposition of this case, which stresses man-
ageability, is in line with current judicial treatment of antitrust class ac-
tions.? Moreover, since several of the named plaintiffs testified that they
would bring individual actions even if certification were not granted, 4 the
court applied a policy that a claim of substantial damages presented by a
discrete group of plaintiffs is superior to class action suit.2
While it appears that the rights of the plaintiffs in Windham were not
foreclosed, the question remains whether plaintiffs whose individual inju-
ries are small, or who cannot afford to bring a suit except as a class action,
would have their interests protected if the district court determined that
the case would be unmanageable as a class action. Certainly the difficul-
ties posed by class action suit diminish that procedure's effectiveness in
protecting the public from antitrust violations.
Congress undertook to remedy this defect in the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.26 Before this Act became effective,2
* 539 F.2d at 1022.
* Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 65 (4th Cir. 1977).
21 Id.
2 Id. at 70-72.
2 See Winthrow & Larm, supra note 18, at 13-21. The authors suggest that the only class
actions that will be certified will be brought by classes of direct purchasers who claim to be
victims of price-fixing or classes of franchisees who can prove the existence of a standardized
franchise agreement. Id. at 16. See also Fourth Circuit, supra note 16, at 790-91.
24 565 F.2d at 69.
See Winthrow & Larm, supra note 18, at 20.
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383. Title I of the Act enhances the investigative power of Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice primarily by increasing the types of information it can demand and by
providing criminal penalties for non-compliance with antitrust laws. This section amends 15
U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1970). For a discussion of criminal sentencing under the antitrust laws,
see Note, Sentencing Antitrust Felons, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097 (1977). Title II of the
Act amends the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq (1970), by requiring certain pre-merger
notification procedures. Title III amends section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970),
by adding §§ 15c-h. These subsections grant state attorneys general the right to bring actions
for damages as parens patriae on behalf of citizens of the state, and allow reasonable attor-
ney's fees to any plaintiff who substantially prevails. For an analysis of the Act, see Kintner,
Griffin & Goldston, The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976: An
Analysis, 46 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 1 (1977)[hereinafter cited as Kintner].
" The Antitrust Improvement Act was enacted on September 30, 1976. Title I became
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antitrust actions for damages under the Clayton Act could be brought only
by a private citizen who had been injured by a violation of the antitrust
laws.2 Individuals could recover treble damages for injuries that had al-
ready occurred, and could seek an injunction of continuing or potential
antitrust violations which threatened them with loss or damage. 9 A corol-
lary right, unstated in the statutes but honored by the courts, was the right
of a state attorney general to gain injunctive relief when the sovereign or
quasi-sovereign interests of the state were threatened by antitrust viola-
tions." Nevertheless, state attorneys general were not permitted to sue as
parens patriae for damages.3 ' Title IV of the Antitrust Improvements Act,
the parens patriae provision, gives state attorneys general the right to bring
antitrust actions for damages.2 Such actions are intended to redress anti-
trust violations which cause individual injuries that are small but numer-
ous?.3
Burch v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.31 was presented to the district
court before passage of the Antitrust Improvements Act. Goodyear, aware
of the Maryland Attorney General's plan to bring an antitrust suit against
the company, sought to enjoin the State of Maryland from enforcing its
antitrust laws.15 The Attorney General counterclaimed, asking that Good-
year and Cities Service be enjoined under section 16 of the Clayton Act36
from continuing an arrangement that allegedly gave Goodyear anticompe-
titive access to Cities Service gasoline stations as retailers of Goodyear's
effective October 1, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435 § 106, 90 Stat. 1390 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1311). Title I became effective 150 days after passage, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 202, 90 Stat.
1394 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a). Title III became effective on the date of enactment,
Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 304, 90 Stat. 1396 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15c). For a discussion
of the Act's effectiveness, see Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1976. 77 COLUM. L. Rlv. 679 (1977)[hereinafter cited as Emerging Issues].
1 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides in pertinent part that
"[a]ny person ... injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue in any district court ......
Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) provides that "[amny person...
shall be entitled to sue for ... injunctive relief ... against threatened loss or damage by
violation of the antitrust laws."
See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945)(state of Georgia, as parens
patriae, claiming damage to economy, granted injunctive relief against twenty railroads that
had conspired to fix prices and regulate trade). Sovereign and quasi-sovereign rights may give
an attorney general the right to sue as parens patriae in contexts other than antitrust. See
Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976) (state sued to protect citizens sued in tax actions
by other state); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)(state sued to protect prisoners'
rights); Woodward v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977)(state sued to protect rights
of juvenile offenders).
11 See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972)(while state may recover treble
damages for injuries to proprietary interests, state may not, as parens patriae, recover dam-
ages on behalf of citizens).
See note 26 supra.
1 HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2575.
31 420 F. Supp. 82 (D. Md. 1976).
Id. at 84.
36 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970); see note 29, supra.
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products. This arrangement allegedly was secured by a secret payment
from Goodyear to Cities Service.37 The Attorney General did not seek dam-
ages.
Goodyear responded in a motion to dismiss that the Attorney General
did not have standing to seek an injunction as parens patriae because the
state had not specified the nature of the damages caused by the antitrust
violations." Goodyear argued that any claims by a state must be based
either upon injuries to the state's proprietary interests or upon injuries to
the state's quasi-sovereign interest in its natural resources and in the
health of its citizens. Goodyear asserted the claims based upon the state's
quasi-sovereign interest also must redress injuries to the state of a type
other than that for which individuals would be able to sue.3" Goodyear
argued that the state's claim of injury to the general economy of the state
was insufficient to confer parens patriae standing since the general econ-
omy was neither a proprietary nor a quasi-sovereign interest of the state."
The district court rejected Goodyear's argument that the state had to
show any injury to its proprietary interests." Rather, the court concluded
that a claim of injury to the general economy of the state was sufficient to
confer parens patriae standing," as is a claim of threatened injury to the
natural resources of the state or the health of its citizens.43 When the
district court refused to grant Goodyear's motion to dismiss," Goodyear
appealed. 5
By the time the Fourth Circuit heard the case, the Antitrust Improve-
ments Act had become effective.." The Fourth Circuit, holding that the
420 F. Supp. at 85.
Id. at 85-86.
'Id.
Although Goodyear's claim ultimately failed since the parens patriae charge was
brought under common law, and not statutory principles, the same action, if brought for
damages under Title I of the Antitrust Improvements Act, see note 47 infra, might fail. That
statute requires that the attorney general allege and prove injury to the citizens of the state.
See HousE REPORT, surpa note 6, at 2578-79.
" 420 F. Supp. at 87.
Id., citing Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
'3 420 F. Supp. at 86-87. The court stated that a state has quasi-sovereign interests in
its natural resources and in the health of its citizens. Id. at 86; cf. North Dakota v. Minnesota,
263 U.S. 365 (1923)(state may sue to enjoin another state's damming of river to protect
plaintiff's citizens from inundation); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921)(state may
sue to enjoin another state from pumping sewage into plaintiff's waters); Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46 (1907)(state may sue another state to assert riparian rights, and to enjoin state
from diverting a river's flow); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907)(state may
sue to enjoin the production of noxious fumes threatening health of its citizens). At the same
time, however, the district court expressed strong sympathy for Goodyear's arguments, stat-
"ing that "[w]ere this court privileged to write on a clean slate it would most likely conclude
that the Attorney General of Maryland lacks standing to bring this suit." 420 F. Supp. at
90.
420 F. Supp. at 92.
Burch v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1977).
" See note 27 supra.
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attorney general's action for injunction was proper, approved the district
court's decision based upon precedent, and considered a fresh objection
raised by Goodyear in light of the wording of the Antitrust Improvements
Act. Goodyear argued that the Act granted attorneys general parens par-
triae rights to bring actions for damages only." Since the Act fails to
mention suits for injunction, Goodyear claimed that no such action was
possible." The Fourth Circuit simply noted the long-standing precedent
permitting such suits. 9 As a further demonstration of the applicability of
the parens patriae doctrine in antitrust injunction suits, the court offered
legislative intent as evidenced by statements of the bill's sponsors."
While the attorney general's counterclaim was for equitable relief, not
for damages, and thus was not affected by the passage of the Antitrust
Improvements Act, Burch illustrates perfectly the type of action contem-
plated by the parens patriae portion of that Act.5 An attorney general who
proves that a violation has occurred and that citizens have been injured
by artificially high prices may recover treble damages for distribution
among the injured consumers.2 Burch simply makes clear that this provi-
sion does not threaten the traditional power of attorneys general to seek
equitable relief in such a situationA
W. RIKER PURCELL
" Title I of the Antitrust Improvements Act amends § 4 of the Clayton Act. The
amendment, to be codified as 15 U.S.C. § 15c, provides that "[alny attorney general of a
state may bring a civil action ... as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in
such State ... to secure monetary relief.., for injury sustained by such natural persons by
by reason of any violation of the Sherman Act. . . ." (emphasis supplied). For a discussion
of the possible ineffectiveness of Title EI, see Emerging Issues, supra note 27, at 701-40.
" 554 F.2d at 635.
" Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). Georgia sued as proprietor of a
state-owned railway that was suffering financial injury resulting from the defendant's prefer-
ence for ports of other states. The State sued for injuntive and monetary relief as a "person"
under section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). Additionally, Georgia asserted
that the state had a right to sue for injunctive relief as parens partriae to redress the injury
to her quasi-sovereign rights. 324 U.S. at 443. The supreme Court recognized both claims of
standing. Id. at 443-52.
0 554 F.2d at 635. The statement of Rep. Rodino explains that the new bill augments
the power of state attorneys general by allowing them to sue for damages as parens patriae.
Case law permitting suits for injunctions is unchanged. 122 CONG. REc. H. 10295-96 (daily
ed. Sept. 16, 1976)(statement of Rep. Rodino). See also, 122 CONG. REC. S. 15417-18 (daily
ed. Sept. 8, 1976)(statement of Sen. Hart).
" HouSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2575-78.
52 S. REP. No. 94-803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in 229 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
43 (May 17, 1976).
5 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). The State of Illinois brought an
antitrust action as a proprietor, rather than as parens patriae. Id. at 726. Illinois had paid a
contractor to build public buildings, making the State an indirect purchaser of the bricks
used in construction. The Court decided that indirect purchasers could not sue for price-fixing
violations. Id. at 736. Since consumers usually are affected only indirectly by supplier price-
fixing, consumers generally are prevented by Illinois Brick from bringing an action under
Clayton Act § 4. Id. at 745. The decision was justified, said the Court, because direct purchas-
ers are injured more palpably than consumers and will be more inclined to bring action. Id.
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at 745-46. For an analysis of the case, see Kintner, note 26 supra at 22-23.
Sen. Edward Kennedy felt that the Illinois Brick decision would render nugatory the
provisions of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, see note 26 supra,
which grant to state attorneys general the right to sue for damages as parens patriae on behalf
of citizens of the state. Since most of these cases would protect the interests of indirect
purchasers, the parens patriae power would be ineffective. On July 15, Sen. Kennedy intro-
duced a bill (S.1874) that would nullify statutorily the adverse effect of Illinois Brick on
consumer interests. See 123 CONG. REc. S.12019 (daily ed. July 15, 1977).
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